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This paper analyses the duration and nature of post-war reconstruction in aid-dependent
developing countries. Part I presents a comparative analysis, Part II discusses the post-war
reconstruction in Nicaragua, and Part III analyses the case of Mozambique.
The main findings are that post-war reconstruction, defined as obtaining external and internal
balance and high per capita growth, is surprisingly difficult to obtain even under favourable
political and economic conditions. The legacy of war is a key constraint on post-war growth,
especially through the damaged commercial network, the loss of trust, and the weakening of
market institutions. In addition, political uncertainty in the post-war period inhibits private
sector investment and significantly reduces the peace dividend. This is worsened by
inappropriate stabilisation policies.
Aid policies should be modified for war and post-war economies to accelerate the reduction in
foreign debt and to support small scale private producers, including those in the countryside.
Military spending does not fall and social spending does not rise as quickly as is generally
expected thus delaying a noticeable reduction in poverty. The clear sequencing but gradual
implementation of government reforms, especially in the social sectors, is important in
maintaining entitlements. Key victims of war, and especially of internal war, are civil and
economic institutions. Their importance in post-war reconstruction has been underestimated
and they should receive priority funding by donors and governments to accelerate post-war
growth and poverty reduction.
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E XECUTIVE S UMMARY
1.  Violent conflict has become more frequent in developing countries in the last two decades, and
international support for peace-making has become more important. However, the problems
of post-war reconstruction have received less attention - despite the fact that over half the
least-developed countries have undergone civil wars in the recent past.
2.  This study addresses the issue of why post-war reconstruction in developing countries is so
difficult and prolonged, despite high levels of foreign aid. Part II and III contain case studies of
Nicaragua and Mozambique, while Part I contains the comparative analysis and draws policy
conclusions. The central policy research hypothesis was that key characteristics of private
sector behaviour determine the speed and sustainability of recovery, and thus the effectiveness
of international co-operation efforts.
3.  The inheritance of the wartime economy itself was important in both cases. This was not
merely a question of the destruction of productive capacity or the displacement of the
population. Rather it was the disarticulation of commercial networks, the loss of trust and the
weakening of market institutions which were the key economic costs. External, fiscal and
private sector solvency, once lost proved very difficult to recover.
4.  A substantial ‘peace dividend’ was expected in both cases when the war ended: due to
reduced defence expenditures, demobilisation of soldiers, and recovered production capacity.
However, this appears to be the first attempt to measure this dividend; and to examine the role
of the private sector in the reconstruction process. The extent of the dividend turned out to be
much less than expected in both cases, and can clearly be dissipated if uncertainty about
political consensus depresses private investment.
5.  Existing policy dialogue focuses on fiscal adjustment, market reforms and poverty alleviation in
the post-war period. While aid has been considerable and monetary stabilisation effective,
achieving external solvency and sustainable growth has proved almost impossible in both
Mozambique and Nicaragua. Structural adjustment policy did not provide sufficient support to
the recovery of agricultural production for food and exports. The multilateral agencies, while
promoting privatisation, paid little direct attention to the needs of the private sector -
particularly small farmers.
6.  Both countries had considerable success in achieving fiscal equilibrium quite quickly after
peace was established; which had positive consequences for inflation. However, reduced
military expenditure could not be translated into increased health and education expenditure,
due in part to continued burden of external debt servicing. The dismantling of the state sector
in order to reduce expenditure also had serious implications for unemployment and rural
support in Nicaragua; while the more gradual approach in Mozambique appears to have been
better for both production and social stability.
7.  Private investment recovered very slowly in both cases, although the greater institutional
stability in Mozambique appears to have helped, and the lack of consensus in Nicaragua - and
thus uncertainty about future policy - was a negative factor. Private savings did not recover to
the same extent as investment; possibly as a consequence of the easy availability of aid funds.
In both cases, the continued debt overhang was both a drain on fiscal and foreign exchange
resources, and a major cause of uncertainty among investors.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS45(1) Page 3 of Part I
8.  In an agrarian economy, both economic progress and social welfare depend upon food and
export production. The two cases studies provide contrasting evidence on this problem. In
Mozambique there was more rapid recovery of food production, which probably helped to
reduce unemployment and poverty; but exports did not recover to the same degree. In
contrast, exports recovered in Nicaragua but food production did not; helping to improve
external solvency but not reducing poverty.
9.  The failure to provide for immediate debt relief in the post-war period - particularly from
multilateral agencies - caused continued uncertainty in the private sector in both cases. The
potential benefits in terms of policy ‘leverage’ were not realised; and the protracted delays in
the ‘HIPC initiative’, in combination with the unrealistic performance criteria, meant that debt
relief made little contribution to post-war reconstruction or poverty alleviation.
10.  Poverty alleviation has been problematic in both cases. Health and education expenditure did
not rise as much as had been hoped. In the case of Nicaragua, the reform process itself and
the neglect of small farmers (particularly the withdrawal of rural credit) led to increasing
poverty levels, which further undermined political consensus. In the case of Mozambique, a
more gradual pace of reform and more rapid revival of small-scale agriculture probably helped
to increase food security and thus contain absolute poverty.
11.  The construction of economic institutions with a broad supporting consensus seems essential to
the recovery of the private sector after a war. The rather slower pace of reform in
Mozambique, based on an implicit alliance between the previously contending parties; appears
to have been more effective than the rapid reforms in Nicaragua, which were supported by
only part of the society.
12.  Finally, the evaluation of post-war reconstruction policy based on large-scale donor support
must be based on the extent to which, once the immediate emergency period is over, a
sustainable growth process has been established. This requires the attainment of solvency in
three dimensions: the external sector in terms of significant export expansion and a manageable
debt level; the fiscal sector in terms of sufficient tax income to fund infrastructure and social
provision without reliance on aid; and the private sector in terms of high levels of domestic
investment and saving, among both large and small producers.
13.  On these criteria neither Mozambique nor Nicaragua had completed post-war reconstruction
ten years after peace had been attained, despite considerable international support and the
pursuit of orthodox economic policies. This experience implies serious reconsideration of the
issue by all concerned - particularly the need for international donors to shift their emphasis
from finance towards production.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS45(1) Page 4 of Part I
P REFACE
This study addresses the issue of post-war economic reconstruction in developing countries.
Unfortunately, this issue is of increasing importance because armed conflict in poor societies have
become more - rather than less - frequent after the end of the Cold War brought super-power
confrontation to an end. Funding was awarded by the Department for International Development
(ESCOR Grant R7216) in order to investigate this problem in more depth, using Mozambique and
Nicaragua as case studies and paying particular attention to the role of the private sector in the post-
war reconstruction process.
The choice of these two countries was guided by a number of criteria. First, they had both
undergone severe civil wars of an ‘ideological’ (not ethnic) nature during the 1980s, so that there
was a sufficiently long reconstruction period in order to evaluate progress. Second, they are both
agricultural economies, where the role of small farmers is crucial to economic development. Third,
both countries have received large volumes of aid from DAC members, which provides an
opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of international co-operation in supporting the
reconstruction effort.
The project team was led by Valpy FitzGerald, who drafted Part I of the study, which contains a
systematic comparison of the two cases and draws general conclusions.  Arturo  Grigsby was
responsible for the case study of Nicaragua in Part II; while Tilman Brück prepared the case study
of Mozambique in Part III. The two case studies were carried out in close collaboration with
counterpart institutions: the Nitlapan Research Institute at the Universidad Centro  Americano in
Managua, Nicaragua; and the Food Security Project at the Ministry of Agriculture in Maputo,
Mozambique. Particular attention was paid to constructing a consistent data base for the two
countries so that valid comparative analysis could be carried out.
Research for the two case studies finished in mid-1999. In consequence, the effects of the disasters
in Nicaragua (October 1999) and Mozambique (February 2000) are not taken into account. The
impact of these natural disasters does not alter - indeed it reinforces – the lessons of post-war
reconstruction drawn in this report.
This draft of the study findings will now be disseminated in order to promote discussion among
scholars, policy makers and practitioners. The two case studies will be translated into Spanish and
Portuguese, respectively, so that they are accessible by a wider readership in Nicaragua and
Mozambique. A summary will be published in both languages. The whole study will also be available
on our website (http://www.qeh.ox.ac.uk) for access and comment by the international community. It
is planned to hold a workshop at Oxford in order to discuss this study at the end of 2000.
E.V.K. FitzGerald,
Director,
Finance and Trade Policy Research Centre,
University of Oxford.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS45(1) Page 5 of Part I
Part I:
The Private Sector in Post-War Reconstruction:
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“An adequate housing programme … involving purchases of
materials and acquisition of land on a large scale … a considerable
transfer of agricultural lands to public authorities for the purpose of
small holdings, soldiers’ settlements, afforestation and reclamation …
the reconstruction of roads and the repair of railways and their
equipment … the financing for a time in whole or in part by the State
of certain essential industries … an extension of unemployment
insurance to meet the dislocation of industry that is to be expected
during the transition period … a strengthened health service both at
the centre and locally.… (As opposed to) the view that everything
should be subordinated to the paying off of debt … (Britain should
be) prepared to incur expenditure essential for establishing at the
earliest possible moment, the fullest measure of productivity.”
British Minister of Reconstruction Christopher Addison in 1918,
cited by Ferguson (1998, p. 421).
1.1 INTRODUCTION
The Cost of Conflict
War in general, and civil war in particular, is one of the main causes of human suffering and economic
underdevelopment. The uneasy calm of the global confrontation between capitalism and communism
during the Cold War may have prevented global nuclear destruction, but in any one of these forty
years a number of countries of what was then known as the “Third World” were at war. Between
1950 and 1990, some fifteen million deaths were caused directly or indirectly by wars of all types in
developing countries - including international conflicts, civil war and government violence against
citizens.(Stewart and FitzGerald, 2000). Yet despite the high incidence of armed conflict in poor
countries, economic analysis of developing countries at war is relatively rare.
That war is very costly in terms of not only the sacrifice of innocent lives, but also of human and
economic development, would be a truism were this fact not so often overlooked by development
theorists and international policy makers. Modern development economists tend to treat countries at
war as subject to exogenous developments which take them outside the normal realms of analysis.
The greater part of the human costs of war does not result directly from battle deaths and injuries,
but rather ‘indirectly’ from the loss of livelihoods caused by the dislocation of economy and society
resulting from conflict. If we are to understand the process of post-war economic reconstruction, in
the hope of reducing these human costs as soon as possible, it is essential that we attempt to
understand the processes that have occurred during the wartime economy.
At best, the Bretton Woods institutions appear to see armed conflicts in or between developing
countries as temporary interruptions to an established economic development path. Post-war
reconstruction is seen as a matter of short term costs (demobilising the military, reconstructingQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS45(1) Page 9 of Part I
damaged infrastructure and resettling refugees) - which can be reasonably covered by an exceptional
aid effort of limited duration - followed by a return to ‘sound’ economic policy rules. These include
orthodox stabilisation policy, a structural adjustment programme (including trade liberalisation and
extensive privatisation) and full integration into world markets.
Post-war reconstruction in practice seems to have taken much longer than expected (at least a
decade in the two cases discussed here) despite large infusions of international development
assistance and repeated attempts to apply the policy framework proposed by the Bretton Woods
institutions. The key constraints appear to be the failure of the private sector - small and medium
farmers in particular - to invest on a sustainable basis; the failure of the government to provide the
security and infrastructure required for this to happen; and the failure of the international community
to design and support reconstruction policies specific to the post-war situation.
The Approach in this Report
The costs of war do not end when peace is established and armed forces demobilised. This Report
builds on two comprehensive case studies of reconstruction after prolonged civil war in two
developing countries - Mozambique and Nicaragua. These two cases are representative of the very
long and difficult process of post-war reconstruction, which many policy-makers (particularly
international agencies) have assumed to be a relatively speedy and unproblematic process as long as
sufficient aid resources are provided. However, the process turns out to be far more complex,
perhaps as much so as the peace-making process itself - while the inflow of aid can turn out to be
highly problematic in itself.
We address three central themes:
First, the effectiveness of economic policies in supporting post-war recovery, particularly
macroeconomic stabilization, recuperation of agricultural production levels and the reduction
of poverty levels.
Second, the way in which post-war recovery has contributed to the building of sustainable
long-term development, with particular reference to working markets, institutional capacity
and the investment of the “peace dividend”.
Third, the role of the donor community in effectively supporting the two previous aims, in
terms of the level and nature of funding, policy conditionality and coherence.
From this analysis, some general considerations as to the design of post-war reconstruction policy in
developing countries are derived, which go beyond economic analysis towards the political economy
of the post-war state and its relationship with donor governments.
In fact, despite their differences of region, culture and previous development level, Mozambique and
Nicaragua do share considerable common features, particularly the nature of their civil war (peasant
resistance to a socialist state-led project, both sides being supported by external powers), the
reliance on small farmers for economic recovery, the emergence of aid dependence, and the
influence of fiscal disequilibrium on the private sector.
The Contents of Part I
In Part I of this study, we draw on the extensive case study material in Parts II and III in order to
draw wider lessons from the comparison of these archetypal two cases. We open with the economic
inheritance of conflict (Section 1.2) and the policies designed to support post-war economic policyQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS45(1) Page 10 of Part I
(Section 1.3). We then turn to the difficulties of achieving a sustainable development path, once the
initial stabilisation of the macro-economy has been achieved (Section 1.4).
The role of donors is critical to this process, and we view this critically (Section 1.5) but also suggest
that this must be seen in the context of the political economy of reconstruction (Section 1.6) rather
than as a purely administrative matter. Finally, Part I concludes with some policy lessons.
1.2 THE INHERITANCE OF WAR
The General Principles
The economic inheritance of conflict goes far beyond the immediate destruction and human losses.
Profound changes take place in the economy, which are not reversed to the pre-war situation by the
cessation of conflict. Patterns of economic behaviour that have emerged in war in response to new
incentives, greater constraints and heightened uncertainty will remain.
On the basis of a detailed comparison of conflict economies in some twenty developing countries,
Stewart and FitzGerald (2000) suggest that there are seven main economic consequences of war.
Six Economic Legacies of War
First, economic growth is almost always negatively affected, sometimes dramatically so, as in the
cases of Mozambique and Nicaragua. However, aggregate output is least affected where the conflict
is confined to one geographic region and export decline can be contained, as in the case of Sri Lanka
or in the recent conflicts in Uganda. The agricultural sector is usually particularly badly hit in civil
wars in developing countries, as people are forced to move in the course of the conflict, as a result of
fighting, land mines, or to camps to secure food.
Second, exports are also invariably negatively affected. This partly stems from the general fall in
production; partly from a shift towards domestic markets in order to sustain domestic consumption in
the face of falling production; and partly from disruptions in international markets. Contrary to what
might be expected at first sight, import capacity usually holds up - often growing even though
exports often fall. This is due to the availability of aid and foreign debt spiralled in every country at
war studied, leaving a huge post-conflict debt burden. In some cases - notably Nicaragua - this
import compression was one of the main causes of a collapse in production.
Third, there is a sectoral shift from tradable to non-tradable sectors, as a consequence of market
disruptions, including undermining of formal organisations, such as banks, reduced trust and failures
of the transport system. One aspect of this - a major consequence of conflict - is a switch to
subsistence and informal activities, including simple production (even arms) and trading (particularly
smuggling). Mozambique illustrates the development of the urban informal sector most graphically;
while the ability to retreat to subsistence agriculture also helps protect nutritional standards - it did so,
for example, during the Amin era in Uganda but not sufficiently in Nicaragua.
Fourth, consumption per head inevitably falls with per capita GDP, even though domestic savings
decline due both to attempts to maintain consumption levels and to uncertainty as to asset values.
Attempts by households to maintain consumption and by the government to protect current
expenditure lead to foreign borrowing and increased aid dependence - in other words ‘foreign
savings’ replace ‘domestic savings’. As expected, government capital formation and large-scale
foreign and private  investment generally fell quite sharply, due to budgetary restrictions andQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS45(1) Page 11 of Part I
increased uncertainty respectively. None the less, aggregate investment did not seem to fall as much
as domestic savings, possibly due to small-scale investment as the informal sector expands and aid-
funded projects - as was the case in Mozambique and Nicaragua.
Fifth, contrary to a priori expectations the government revenue share of GDP did not invariably fall
among countries in conflict. In many cases, such as Nicaragua and Mozambique, it rose quite
sharply; while in a few cases, government revenue-raising ability was totally undermined - for
example in Uganda and in Sierra Leone. This difference was important in determining whether the
government could, in practice or in principle, sustain public entitlements. In all cases government
expenditure rose more than revenue and budget deficit widened, financed by a combination of
foreign and domestic borrowing and increased money supply. But despite the rising budget deficit,
inflation was quite moderate in the majority of cases, and hyperinflation occurred rarely. The share
of government expenditure allocated to military items invariably increased, making it difficult to
sustain social and economic expenditure, and in almost all cases the share of social expenditure fell,
sometimes severely.
Sixth, as a result of falling entitlements, heavy human costs were experienced in most countries
leading, in addition to the deaths and injuries from the war itself, to worse infant mortality rates than
would have occurred in the absence of war, and deteriorating nutrition and health standards.
However, Nicaragua gave increased priority to social expenditure compared with the pre-war
situation and thereby succeeded in increasing public entitlements, but this was exceptional. Public
entitlements fell in most cases, although some governments did attempt to sustain health services and
food rations throughout the country, even in rebel held areas. Civic entitlements compensated to
some extent for lost public entitlements through NGO efforts to deliver food and other services in
Mozambique.
The Vulnerability of the Economy at War
The economic effects of war are the result of an interaction between a particular type of war and the
economy in which takes place, and these define its ‘vulnerability’. Those characteristics which seem
to be most important are: the average income level; the degree of self-subsistence of the poor;
reliance on essential imports; and the flexibility of the production system.
The average level of income of an economy determines what proportion of the population is near or
below the poverty line - whether they are already near the edge of survival so that a substantial
reduction can have devastating consequences in terms of survival. Dependence of the poor on
product or labour markets, or on public services also matters if these are destroyed or disarticulated
by war. In contrast, where there is an extensive rural food sector and so long as this is not directly
destroyed by war, then poor households maybe able to survive by retreating into subsistence.
Similarly, if people have not had access to public entitlements, they will not suffer so much from their
loss; so that urban populations may suffer more than rural ones and periods of war may be
characterized by a reversal of secular migration flows.
Finally, the length and nature of the war is another important determinant of the costs of conflict.
Obviously a long war will have different effects from a short-one: in a long war reserves will be
exhausted, so vulnerability is greater. However, given time people will have time to adapt their life-
styles in order to enhance their productivity and well-being in the context of the war. The geographic
spread of the war is also important. When confined to one part of the country, the war may have
only small direct effects on the economy as a whole and thus reduce the overall war vulnerability of
the economy. However, where this direct cost is large in relation to the resources of the state, the
indirect social costs may become very large, increasing vulnerability.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS45(1) Page 12 of Part I
Analytically, it is helpful to distinguish between the consequences of the direct impact of the conflict
on the one hand, and of the compensating behaviour of economic agents in their attempt to moderate
or offset the negative impacts of war, on the other. There are certain direct effects arising from
conflict, which cause other effects as they work their way through the economy. These effects
include:
(i) an output loss as people move from their place of work because they join the fighting,
are killed or flee;
(ii) the destruction of capital (such as large energy plants) through bombing or arson, and
the consequent loss of output;
(iii) the disruption of transport due to physical destruction;
(iv) the loss of trust between economic agents, reducing market transactions;
(v) the disruption of international markets due to frontier closure or embargoes;
(vi) and the diversion of scarce foreign exchange from economic and social needs to military
uses.
These effects will tend to reduce aggregate levels of output, including exports. Reduced agricultural
output, and disrupted internal and international markets are particularly likely to affect exports
adversely. Labour markets will be  disarticulated as unskilled men of prime working age are
particularly hit by violent deaths and military recruitment; while skilled labour is most likely to leave
the country. Hence an important indirect effect will be reduced foreign exchange availability for
productive inputs leading to a shortage of imported inputs and, consequently, to a further fall in
output and exports.
Aggregate indicators of human well-being - for example, mortality rates, nutrition standards and
school enrolment - would be expected to worsen compared with what they would have been in the
absence of the war. This does not mean they necessarily fall in absolute terms, but that improvement
is less than in normal times. In addition, distributional changes will occur, and some groups (those
favoured by the government or foreign forces, and those with military strength) may gain more than
their peace-time prospects while others will lose much more than proportionately to national
performance. Indeed some individuals can make spectacular fortunes, which in the context of falling
average incomes implies that many more households must have suffered disproportionately.
Due to shortages of consumer goods, fuels and foreign exchange, groups with access to these
commodities (including not only traders and smugglers but also military leaders, civil servants and
even those working with aid agencies) are likely to make large profits. In contrast, those trying to
gain access to these commodities such as small farmers, formal sector wage earners, women and
children are likely to suffer from the redistribution implicit in shortages and inflation which undermine
their entitlements as discussed above.
The Development Costs of War
War clearly reduces the potential for future economic growth and social improvements in developing
countries, by destroying installed capital and reductions in new investment. By ‘capital’ in this context
(and others) we understand:
(i) productive capacity (eg plant, equipment and natural resources including land free of
mines);
(ii) economic infrastructure (eg roads, bridges and railway tracks);QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS45(1) Page 13 of Part I
(iii) social infrastructure (eg schools and hospitals);
(iv) human capital (eg health and skills);
(v) collective assets such as organisational capital (eg government capacity);
(vi) and social capital (eg trust and culture).
The development costs of war are far greater than the destruction associated with natural disasters,
for two reasons. First, natural disasters such as floods, hurricanes and earthquakes tend to destroy
housing and transport infrastructure, but have less effect on productive capacity and leave human
capital (other than those killed of course) intact. Second, as organisational and social capital remains
intact and natural disasters tend to be of relatively short duration, investment quickly recovers and
may even have a positive multiplier effect on the economy as a whole (Alaba-Bertrand, 1993). In
marked contrast, war destroys all forms of capital and the uncertainty it causes reduces investment
radically. In particular, the destruction of entitlements which occurs during conflict constitutes an
important development cost, as worsening levels of human education and nutrition reduce the human
resources of an economy. The output losses discussed above will also lead to development costs as
they reduce the capacity of the economy to invest, even with an unchanged investment ratio.
The range of capital destruction in wartime is not only broad but also of those capacities which are
recognised as being critical for sustainable development in poor countries. Organisational capital can
be severely weakened, as a result of the enfeebling of governments often associated with civil war,
the worsening infrastructure and the out-migration of skilled people and foreigners, so that the
government administrative machinery becomes less effective, banks may cease to work, etc. But
again this depends on the nature of war. In some contexts (normally international wars), government
machinery is strengthened by war. Social capital tends to be destroyed, with trust being weakened,
community ties destroyed by fighting or the mass movement of people, and so on.
Undoubtedly, there tends to be a disintegration of existing forms. But new forms can develop, with,
for example, new forms of authority and governance among rebel movements; informal financing
mechanisms developing to substitute for the collapsed formal sector;  NGOs, local and foreign,
substituting for government, and so on. How far this occurs is likely to depend on the society, the
development of the war and the actions of outside actors. Moreover, these new forms of
organisational and social capital may not be so appropriate to peacetime conditions. But they should
not be entirely discounted as a new development resource emerging, to a varying extent, in some
conflict- ridden societies.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS45(1) Page 14 of Part I
Table 1.1: Development Costs of War
Category of capital Destruction of existing stock Impact on new investment
Productive capital – plant,
equipment and buildings
Land mined; agribusiness plant
abandoned; transport stolen.
Fall in private productive
investment; some investment
in informal activities.





Social infrastructure Schools, hospitals, clinics
damaged
Human capital Death, migration (specially of
skills); worsened nutrition and
health of workforce
Decline in public entitlements,
especially health and
education.




No resources in formal sector;
new informal organisations
develop; NGOs take on new
activities.
Social capital Destruction of trust; work ethic;
respect for property; community
links
New forms of social capital,
through groups that develop
links in war; NGO activity.
1.3 ECONOMIC RECOVERY POLICY AND THE PEACE DIVIDEND
Post-War Recovery and the Peace Dividend
The widespread expectation - not least among the civilian population that have suffered from conflict
- is that the ending of open warfare in a peace settlement and subsequent demobilisation of the
armed forces, would lead rapidly to a recovery of the economy. This perception is encapsulated by
the notion of the ‘peace dividend’. In its original sense, the peace dividend refers to the reduction of
military expenditure and the redirection of resources towards civilian production. In developed
countries (eg the US after WWII), this would mean that the army would return to the agricultural and
industrial labour force, and that output (and imports) would shift from supporting the military towards
consumption and productive investment. In the case of developed countries which had suffered
widespread destruction (eg Germany after WWII) there would also be widespread destruction of
plant and infrastructure, plus a loss of much of the labour force; but precisely for that reason and
investment and demographic boom is to be expected in post-war years. Historically this has not
always occurred automatically; particularly where the sharp reduction of demand as government
expenditure is scaled back (as in the case of the UK after both World Wars) leads to recession or
where a large debt has to be serviced (eg Germany after WWI); which is the reason why extensive
reconstruction assistance (eg the Marshall Plan) may be justified.
In developing countries the situation is rather different. On the one hand, the productive capacity is
not simply switched from peace to war and back again. The productive system has been destroyed
or distorted by the conflict, while the military labour force may be unwilling or unable to simply return
to farming like some latter-day Cincinnatus. Widespread insecurity can persist, personal security still
not be restored, and property rights remain uncertain. On the other hand, the problems of
underdevelopment - widespread poverty, human capital, low investment, external constraints and so
on - have been exacerbated by the years of conflict. The social pressure to address these problemsQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS45(1) Page 15 of Part I
is all the greater at just the point when the attention of the international community is reduced by the
official cessation of conflict and thus the apparent end to the ‘humanitarian emergency’.
The cases of Mozambique and Nicaragua illustrate this problematic very clearly.
As Figure 1.1 shows, per capita income fell drastically during the war: allowing for measurement
differences, the decline was of the order of one half in both cases. In Nicaragua per capita income,
which had been rising in the late 1970s, fell by nearly one-third in 1979-80 as a result of the
Sandinista insurrection against Somoza. It stabilised in the early 1980s, but renewed its decline as
conflict was renewed with outside support, reaching one half of the mid-1970s level by 1990 when
conflict was nominally resolved in 1990. Again, in the case of Mozambique, allowing for differences
in measurement between ‘gross social product’ (GSP) and ‘gross domestic product’ (GDP) the
post-independence conflict period from 1975 to 1987 is marked by a decline of per capita incomes
by nearly two-thirds made up of a sharp decline immediately after independence, a certain degree of
stabilisation in the late 1970s, and then a sharp decline as externally-supported civil war broke out.
Figure 1.1: GDP per Capita in Mozambique and Nicaragua (1980 US $)
The striking result, therefore is the similarity between wartime experience of the two countries.
Indeed, the pattern of wartime per capital income decline (allowing for the four-fold absolute income
differential) is almost identical but with a time differential of some five years. Although both countries
were far from recovering pre-war levels of income a full decade after the conflict had been nominally
settled, Figure 1.1 clearly indicates that Mozambique recovered much more rapidly than Nicaragua.
None the less, both countries could lay claim to be solvent ‘middle income’ countries before the war,
with average incomes similar to that of their respective regions, albeit with severe  distributional
inequalities and thus serious poverty problems (see Table 1.2). Both are now countries with incomes
far below the regional average and serious debt problems despite over a decade of post-war
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Table 1.2: Regional Income Comparison for Mozambique and Nicaragua
(GNP per capita in 1995 US $)
1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997
Mozambique .. .. 124 93 96 131
Sub-Saharan Africa 556 582 573 528 491 503
Ratio (percent) .. .. 21.6 17.6 19.5 26.0
Nicaragua 782 906 540 458 325 408
Latin America & Caribbean 2840 3334 3273 3407 3359 3706
Ratio (percent) 27.5 27.2 16.5 13.4 9.7 11.0
A major difference between peace and war should be the ‘peace dividend’. We would expect to see
this demonstrated most clearly in levels of military expenditure. Figure 1.2 shows the level of defence
expenditure in Mozambique and Nicaragua as a proportion of GDP. In the case of Mozambique,
defence expenditure rose from less than 6 percent of GDP in 1980 to 12 percent at its height in
1984. From this year onwards it declined very slowly indeed for the next ten years, remaining around
the 10 percent level. It was only in the mid-1990s that defence expenditure finally fell back towards
pre-war levels of 4 percent of GDP.
Figure 1.2: Defence Expenditure in Nicaragua and Mozambique (percent of GDP)
Interestingly, Nicaragua has similar starting and finishing points, although the intervening trajectory is
very different. Military expenditure rose from 8 percent of GDP in 1981 to a very high level of 16-18
percent in 1985-1990. However, unlike in the case of Mozambique, expenditure fell sharply as soon
as peace was declared, staying at 5-6 percent of GDP throughout the 1990s. The reasons why this
was so are obvious: the radical military government remained in power in Mozambique but lost the
elections in Nicaragua. None the less, we might expect that economic recovery would have been
more rapid in Nicaragua than in Mozambique because a ‘peace dividend’ of the order of over 10
percent of GDP had been gained by the reduction in defence expenditure. The resources released
were, of course, young men who still had to be clothed and fed and could only be a productive
resource if adsorbed back into a growing agricultural sector - a factor that was to prove to turn out



















































Nicaragua MozambiqueQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS45(1) Page 17 of Part I
Post-War Economic Performance
As we have seen, both economies recovered relatively slowly after armed conflict ceased, although
Mozambique did perform rather better. Both countries applied fairly conventional stabilisation
programmes in the post-war period in order to reduce the level of inflation, which was felt to be not
only distorting relative prices but also causing uncertainty and thus depressing investment. In the case
of Nicaragua, this was achieved in just two years as the result of sudden fiscal contraction in not only
military but also civilian expenditure and the dismantling of state enterprises. As Figure 1.3 shows,
the result was the elimination of the hyperinflation of the late 1980s (itself the result of attempts at
monetary correction without fiscal retrenchment) and the achievement of an annual inflation level of
the order of 10 percent per annum during the reconstruction period.
In contrast, although Mozambique had suffered from rising inflation rates during the war, only one
year (1987) could be described as hyper-inflationary. The fiscal and monetary restraints were far
less severe than in Nicaragua: military expenditure stayed relatively higher and state restructuring was
much slower. In fact inflation continued at 40-60 percent per annum between 1988 and 1995, only
declining to acceptable levels in the late 1990s when the economy was finally liberalised. As in the
case of the ‘peace dividend’ from military expenditure cuts, it might be expected that this would have
led to recovery being quicker - but as we have seen, this was not the case.
Figure 1.3: Inflation in Mozambique and Nicaragua (percent per annum)
In fact, as the case studies in Parts II and III demonstrate, much of the difference was in agricultural
performance; itself the product of post-war pacification (or lack thereof) and macro-economic
policy. In Nicaragua, rural markets recovered quite quickly after the war ended, although depressed
world prices remained a problem for exporters. However, the combination of a lack of credit (due to
monetary policy and financial liberalisation) and the over-valuation of the exchange rate (due the tight
monetary policy and the level of aid) meant that incentives to invest were minimal and the land area
under cultivation expanded very slowly.
In Mozambique, rural markets recovered much more slowly, but producers were less dependent on
credit and were helped by favourable weather conditions and the ability to return to abandoned
farmland. Again, the level of investment in infrastructure in Nicaragua remained low due to the fiscal
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aid, which probably depressed domestic production) towards the reconstruction of roads, hospitals
and schools.
The result can be seen in Figure 1.4. Even allowing for some over-estimation of investment rates in
the case of Mozambique, the contrast with Nicaragua is striking. In the latter case, the relatively low
wartime investment levels were maintained through the first half of the 1990s, and although private
investment began to recover in the late 1990s, this was mainly related to a construction boom in
Managua and not to capacity formation in agriculture. In Mozambique, however, post-war
investment levels least double as a share of GDP; and even though much of this is aid projects, it
helps explain the relatively rapid recovery in comparison with Nicaragua.
Figure 1.4: Investment Levels in Mozambique and Nicaragua (percent of GDP)
In sum, it would appear that while monetary stability can be restored relatively quickly, and that this
is clearly a necessary condition for post-war reconstruction, far more is needed in order to restore
investment levels and farm production. Indeed, the case of Nicaragua seems to indicate that the form
of stabilisation and structural adjustment policy can actually delay recovery even if it eliminates
inflation and restores fiscal balance.
Post-War Social Performance
The widespread notion that social conditions are very bad during war and necessarily improve in
peacetime is not necessarily correct. Indeed, in the UK during WWII for instance health and nutrition
standards actually improved, only to deteriorate again in the immediate post-war years. Both
Nicaragua and Mozambique had progressive regimes during their war periods, regimes which were
committed to reducing poverty and extending health access. These policies tended to undermined in
peacetime by the effects of economic liberalisation and fiscal retrenchment; which in turn affected
both income inequality and health provision.
One reflection of the ‘peace dividend’ is that the decline of military expenditure frees fiscal resources
for health and education. Figure 1.5 shows the long-term trends in current expenditure on health and
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reversed in the latter half of the decade as social expenditure is ‘crowded out’ by rising defence
commitments (see Figure 1.2). Social expenditure rises again in the early 1990s, and might be
thought to reflect the ‘peace dividend’; but most of this was financed by renewed aid inflows (see
Figure 1.17 below) and expenditure stabilised again by the mid-1990s at a level similar to that a
decade earlier. In other words, economic reconstruction did not involve a major improvement in
social expenditure, although it did continue a long term upward trend.
In Mozambique, the relative level of health and expenditure was much lower than in Nicaragua. In
absolute terms they were very different indeed: in the mod-1990s expenditure per capita in
Nicaragua was about US $ 50 per capita (at 1980 prices) compared to US $ 10 in Mozambique.
Expenditure rose in the late 1980s, again as part of the ‘peace dividend’ but only from 3 to 4 percent
of GDP. However, it fell in the early 1990s under fiscal retrenchment (see Figure 1.13 below) and
although it subsequently recovered somewhat, health and education expenditure still only accounted
for 10 percent of fiscal expenditure by the end of the decade.
Figure 1.5: Health and Education Expenditure in Mozambique and Nicaragua
(percent of GDP)
This relatively poor performance in terms of social expenditure does permit a reallocation of
resources towards post-war priorities, of course. In fact, both Nicaragua and Mozambique did
target shift towards provision of primary health and education, and a focus on children in particular -
possible under the influence of aid donors (NGOs in particular) as much as from the domestic
electorate. As Figure 1.6 indicates, Nicaragua managed to increase the coverage of infant DPT
immunisation from 15 to 70 percent during the conflict-torn 1980s; and this progress was sustained
during post-war reconstruction, when the coverage reached over 80 percent. In the case of
Mozambique, the coverage declined seriously during the war, and although it has recovered in the
reconstruction period, it had only reached 60 percent by the end of the 1990s.
In the case of Nicaragua (see Part II) World Bank surveys clearly indicate both a worsening of
income distribution and rising poverty in the 1990s. The decline in income per capita in the 1980s
had not led to increased poverty because the income distribution had improved, in part due to wealth
losses by the rich, but also measures designed to help the poor - such as land redistribution, inflation
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of income is not surprising. When combined with slow average income growth, the rise in poverty
was only to be expected. Although the data on income distribution in Mozambique is poor (see Part
III), the more rapid recovery in per capita GDP has helped to avoid an increase in absolute poverty
numbers - which in this case would imply starvation.
Figure 1.6: Infant Immunisation Coverage (percent of age group)
Surprisingly perhaps, the net effect of these two forces - private incomes and public health - seems
to have been positive in both our cases when measured in terms of the key human welfare indicator,
infant mortality. As Figure 1.7 indicates, infant mortality in Mozambique declined steadily throughout
the war (as public health standards rose) and continued to decline in peacetime. None the less, the
level remains high by international standards, and more progress might have been made - the
apparent increase in 1998 is worrying. In the case of Nicaragua, the trend shows considerable
progress in reducing infant mortality (from 100 to 60 infant deaths per 1000 live births) during the
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Figure 1.7: Infant Mortality in Mozambique and Nicaragua (per thousand live births)
In sum, economic recovery alone is clearly not sufficient to reduce poverty, unless it is very rapid and
does not involve a deterioration of the income distribution. If either economic liberalisation worsens
distribution (as it usually does) or GDP does not grow much faster than the population - or a
combination of the two - than post-war poverty is very likely to increase. This does not only mean
continued human suffering by the vulnerable: it also implies that social tensions will continue and make
sustainable economic recovery all the more difficult.
1.4 REACHING A SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT PATH
The Process of Economic Reconstruction
The reconstruction of the economy after a war involves the establishment of ‘solvency’ in the wide
sense. There are three basic elements:
first, the recovery and expansion of the export base in order to generate the foreign exchange
income necessary to provide current imports, undertake debt service and eventually finance
the investment required for growth;
second, the reorganisation of the fiscal sector so that there are sufficient tax revenues, an
efficient expenditure system, and a manageable debt level; and
third, the rebuilding of the institutions necessary to allow the private sector to revive and
contribute to sustainable growth, employment creation and rising income levels.
In the short run these three functions can be temporarily replaced by an international aid effort, but
the measure of the effectiveness of this effort is not the immediate welfare gains but whether solvency































































Nicaragua MozambiqueQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS45(1) Page 22 of Part I
Export Reconstruction
Post-war export recovery is a double task. On the one hand, the existing export capacity must be
restored. In an agrarian economy, this means the recovery of land (which may be mined), the return
and possibly re-training of the labour force, the recuperation of traditional volumes and quality of
production, the repair of processing facilities and transport infrastructure (roads and ports) and the
re-establishment of trading and financial linkages with traditional markets. On the other hand, the
changes in the regional and world economy during the war period must be adapted to. This may
mean the development of new product lines, penetrating new export markets, competing with other
exporters and discovering new sources of trade credit. These are tasks which a weakened private
sector finds very difficult and costly to carry out. In consequence, it is not surprising to find that
exports recover slowly after a war. This problem may be exacerbated by the aid programme in a
‘Dutch Disease’ effect : first, the influx of ‘free’ foreign exchange can lead to an over-valuation of the
currency and consequently reduce exporters’ profitability; second, the availability of imports
increases the profitability of non-traded sectors such as commerce and construction, which are much
easier for the private sector to expand into than export recovery.
As Figure 1.8 indicates, both Mozambique and Nicaragua experienced considerable export declines
during the conflict period - losing over half their foreign exchange revenue in the process. In the case
of Nicaragua, this decline continued into the first half of the 1990s, as the initial reconstruction
programme led to currency overvaluation as hyperinflation was eliminated, while rural unrest
prevented export farms from returning to full production. The latter half of the 1990s saw strong
export growth, however - although this was largely based on tax-free export zones exporting light
manufactures from Managua rather than a true rural revival. Mozambique also managed a
considerable export revival based on the agricultural output recovery. Recovery was much steadier
but also slower than in Nicaragua, taking over a decade to recover pre-war levels. In both cases,
however, export levels in real dollar terms (let alone per capita) remained at well below pre-war
levels. This failure of the agro-export sector to recover in both cases also had serious consequences
for rural employment.
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Imports, however, did not follow the export trend, as Figure 1.9 demonstrates. Nicaraguan import
levels were maintained throughout the war period, and recovered sharply after peace was attained in
1990. In the second half of the 1990s imports expand rapidly due to a combination of trade
liberalisation and export growth. In marked contrast, imports to Mozambique decline seriously
during the war period, reaching half their pre-war level by 1985 as the modern sector of the
economy ground to a halt. The peace process and structural adjustment (particularly import
liberalisation) led to a rapid import recovery in the late 1980s: in the 1990s the pre-war import level
was more or less maintained. In both cases, as we shall see, this import recovery was mainly made
possible by aid inflows and foreign borrowing.
Figure 1.9: Imports to Mozambique and Nicaragua (US $ millions)
The consequent imbalance between exports and imports in the two economies has led to very large
and persistent post-war trade deficits in both Mozambique and Nicaragua - as Figure 1.10 shows.
In the case of Mozambique the trade deficit as a proportion of GDP was actually declining during the
war - albeit due to the slowdown of the formal sector. However, during the 1990s this trade gap
actually increased, fluctuation around an average of 50 percent of GDP between 1988 and 1994.
This was clearly unsustainable, and in fact the structural adjustment efforts of the late 1990s, in
combination with the decline of aid and the slow export recovery, reduced the trade deficit towards
30 percent of GDP - still unsustainable in the long run.
In Nicaragua, in contrast, the trade deficit rose as a proportion of GDP during the war; and initially
fell when this ended. However, it then steadily rose again due to a combination of trade liberalisation
and access to foreign finance - fluctuating around 30 percent of GDP which was - as in the case of
Mozambique - unsustainable in the long run. We will return to this problem in the next Section of
Part I.
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Figure 1.10: Trade Deficit in Mozambique and Nicaragua (percent of GDP)
Fiscal Reorganisation
The first step towards fiscal solvency is the recovery of tax revenue. As Figure 1.11 indicates,
current government revenue in Mozambique declined seriously in the war years, falling by over a half
as a proportion of GDP. This easily explained in terms of the declining tax base, and the immediate
post-war years saw a strong recovery as would be expected as economic activity picked up again
and the government regained control of the national territory. However, the subsequent decade has
seen a gradual decline in tax pressure - which did not exceed 20 percent of GDP, compared to 28
percent in 1982. This made debt service and adequate provision of social services very difficult,
despite the decline in military expenditure.
In the case of Nicaragua fiscal revenue rose rapidly in the early 1980s as a consequence of more
effective collection, from 22 percent of GDP in 1980 to 35 percent in 1984. However, the
hyperinflationary process undermined the tax base and revenue had declined to 15 percent of GDP
by 1990. Post-war efforts at stabilisation have involved a sustained attempt to recover the wartime
effectiveness of tax collection, and despite widespread corruption revenue reached 30 percent of
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Figure 1.11: Current Government Revenue in Mozambique and Nicaragua
(percent of GDP)
As discussed above, the rise of military expenditure in wartime and its subsequent peacetime decline
is a central feature of reconstruction in both economies. As Figure 1.12 indicates, both economies
have followed strikingly similar fiscal paths in this respect. In the case of Mozambique, the military
share in the budget rose from 20 to 35 percent between 1980 and 1985; declining steadily thereafter
to less than 10 percent of the total in 1998. Similarly, the military share of the Nicaraguan budget
rose from 20 to 40 percent between 1982 and 1987, declining to below 10 percent in 1998. The
only real difference is the more gradual and steady adjustment in Mozambique compared to the
sudden shift in Nicaragua: is may well be that subsequent unrest in Nicaragua, compared to the
higher level of social cohesion in Mozambique, is related to this shift. However, in principle at least,
both countries should have benefited from a ‘peace dividend’ of the order of 20 percent of the
budget - which could be assigned to social expenditure or deficit reduction.
As we have seen social expenditure was maintained and even grew in both countries after the war,
although not as much as might have been expected. As Figure 1.13 indicates, in Nicaragua the share
of the budget allocated to health and education actually rose from around 20 percent in the 1980s to
around 30 percent in the 1990s. In Mozambique, in contrast, the corresponding budget share was
fairly stable at around 10 percent level throughout the post-war period. This latter figure seems very
low in relation to the needs of the population and the relatively ample resources available from
taxation and aid grants. It may reflect, however, the fact that many social services are directly
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Figure 1.12: Military Budgets in Mozambique and Nicaragua
(percent of total government expenditure)
One of the major problems of post-war fiscal management in both countries has been the level of
outstanding foreign debt, and the consequent service costs. We shall return to this point later in Part I
, but here it is worth noting that interest costs have risen to occupy a significant share of the budget -
indeed to some extent they have balanced the decline in military expenditure and thus used up much
of the ‘peace dividend’.
Figure 1.13: Health and Education Budgets (percent of total government expenditure)
As Figure 1.14 indicates, Mozambique began to service its debt with the onset of structural
adjustment in the mid-1980s, since when it has fluctuated around 6 percent of the budget. In the case
of Nicaragua, interest payments fell during the war as debt was not serviced, but immediately
afterwards interest payments resumed varying widely in subsequent years dependent on the status of
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Figure 1.14: External Interest Burden in Mozambique and Nicaragua
(percent of total government expenditure)
The outcome of these income and expenditure trends was continued fiscal disequilibrium. In both
countries the fiscal deficit followed a remarkably similar - albeit predictable - path during the war: the
deficit rose from 10 percent to over 25 percent of GDP; which in neither case was sustainable.
However, Mozambique maintained this extraordinarily high deficit into the mid-1990s, and only
began to reduce this towards pre-war levels by the end of the decade. Even then, this level of deficit
would clearly be unsustainable if it had to be financed domestically rather than through aid. In
contrast, Nicaragua cut the fiscal deficit back to 10 percent of GDP as soon as the war ended, but
this rose again subsequently and was only cut back to a sustainable level of 5 percent of GDP at the
end of the decade.




























































































































Nicaragua MozambiqueQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS45(1) Page 28 of Part I
Rebuilding Institutions
It is very difficult indeed to make meaningful comparisons between the institutions of two very
different societies. None the less, such a comparison is necessary if we are to understand the
differences in economic behaviour and, perhaps more importantly, design appropriate reconstruction
policies.
In the case of Nicaragua, markets were apparently working very soon after the end of the war and
the dismantling of state controls over the economy. However, private activity in productive
(especially exports and small farming) sectors only responded slowly to this liberalisation. In
retrospect it is clear that the problem of property rights in general - and law and order in rural areas
in particular - was more important in explaining slow private response than the form of economic
policy. What is more, the sudden shifts in economic policy further increased uncertainty among
private investors.
In contrast, the return to markets (which had not been highly functional before the war in any case)
was much slower in the case of Mozambique. Indeed, unlike in Nicaragua, property rights were not
the central issue in rural recovery - rather it was the infrastructure of markets themselves that was
missing - ranging from transport infrastructure to enforceable commercial contracts. In part this
difference was due to the improvement in the law and order situation (while in Nicaragua it had been
better in those localised areas where fighting was taking place) after the war. It was possibly also the
case that traditional collective property forms were stronger in Mozambique (as opposed to modern
‘capitalist’ or ‘socialist’ forms in Nicaragua) and thus that property rights were considered stable
independently of official institutions. In other words - contrary to expectations - the less developed
economy of the two was better positioned for recovery. However, this may be too simple an
explanation - as we shall see in the discussion of the political economy of reconstruction below.
In sum, the reconstruction period did not really establish the basis for sustainable growth in either
Mozambique or Nicaragua ten years after peace. In order to do so exports would have to be at least
their level at that point, and if tax pressure had reached a natural limit then debt service would have
had to be reduced to zero in order to permit adequate levels of social and infrastructure expenditure.
Mozambique made much more progress in rebuilding institutions, despite the higher level of
development in Nicaragua. This appears to have had much to do with fact that the post-war political
regime in Mozambique appears to have enjoyed more social support than in Nicaragua, a point to
which we shall return later on in Part I. However, there is still in both countries a real danger of
‘economic regress’ (Sen, 1994) and thus fiscal strains that could bring about a return to conflict.
During the reconstruction period these tensions were ‘resolved’ by recourse to aid, a topic which we
address next.
1.5 ROLE OF THE DONORS
The Scale and Scope of Aid
A key characteristic of the post-war reconstruction period in both Mozambique and Nicaragua is the
very large amount of external assistance (in relation the size of these economies) that was supplied by
donors. While the intention of this aid was clearly to support the reconstruction process, it is not
obvious whether - in the event - this was the long-term consequence. In particular, while it is clear
that aid maintained consumption levels above what they might otherwise have been - and to that
extent reduced the incidence of poverty - it is far less clear that aid contributed to a sustainableQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS45(1) Page 29 of Part I
development path.
Mozambique received about US $ 500 millions a year on average throughout the 1990s, which was
equivalent to about two-thirds of imports and 60 percent of the government budget. Figure 1.16
shows the very low level of aid until the start of structural adjustment in the mid-1980s, when it rose
rapidly towards 70 percent and then reached an extraordinary peak of 120 percent of GDP in 1992,
the year of a drought and the peace agreement. After this, aid declined in relative terms towards a
still large level of 40 percent of GDP. None the less, aid was still more important than exports as a
source of foreign exchange after six years of reconstruction.
Aid to Nicaragua too rose rapidly after peace was established in 1990. Some US $ 600 millions a
year was received between 1990 and 1995, declining somewhat to US $ 400 million a year between
1996 and 1999: equivalent to 30 and 25 percent of GDP respectively. These flows financed about
one third of imports and half the government budget during the reconstruction period.
Figure 1.16: Aid to Mozambique and Nicaragua (percent of GDP)
However, these aggregate figures do not give a very clear indication of the economic impact of this
enormous (in relation to the size of these economies) inflow of resources. This is for three reasons:
First, much of the gross flows are related to the refinancing of debt or the accumulation of
central bank reserves; and thus are accounting entries and do not enter the economy as such
- unless it is assumed that these transactions would otherwise have adsorbed domestic
resources.
Second, aid can involve a transfer of resources to the public or private sector; the transfer to
the public sector should be evident in the fiscal accounts, although these may not reflect all
state activities; transfer to the private sector involves direct distribution to households (eg
food aid) and support of local NGOs.
Third; within both the public and private sector, aid may logically result in investment or
consumption (with a consequent effect on saving); ideally the support of consumption will
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As Tables 1.4 and 1.5 in the next Section indicate, the impact of this aid on the balance of investment
and savings in the economy - and thus private sector behaviour - was very large in both our two
economies during the reconstruction period. Table 1.3 summarises this data for a late war/early post-
war year and a late post-war year from each economy. From this it is evident that the level of ‘fiscal
aid dependency’ was much higher in Mozambique than in Nicaragua, as might be expected, and that
this dependency did not decline during reconstruction in either case. However, despite this reliance
on aid resources, the public sector did shift from dis-saving to positive saving in both countries, so
that the aid was used for investment and - as domestic borrowing became negative in both cases -
towards financing the private sector.
The considerable scale of net external finance to the private sector is also evident in both cases: while
in the case of Mozambique this reliance declines, in Nicaragua it becomes larger, as reconstruction
proceeds. In the case of Mozambique, this is mainly aid-financed, but clearly private savings recover,
so that while aid was supporting private consumption at the outset, it is subsequently financing about
half of private investment. In the case of Nicaragua, the picture is quite different because private
capital inflows are renewed by the end of the period: aid basically supports the fiscal sector. The
public sector is a net domestic lender, which has the effect of supporting the private sector. The
private sector has a corresponding and increasingly negative savings rate, thus indicating financial
unsustainability.
Table 1.3: Aid and Investment in Mozambique and Nicaragua (percent of GDP)
Mozambique Nicaragua
1988 1996 1991 1998
Public Sector Investment 22.1 18.7 4.7 8.6
Saving -4.7 2.0 -3.5 6.4
Balance -26.8 -16.7 -7.9 -2.2
External Finance 22.9 18.5 12.4 11.0
Internal Finance 3.9 -1.8 -4.5 -8.8
Private Sector
Investment 21.2 28.6 13.9 22.9
Saving -6.1 13.5 -2.2 -13.0
Balance -27.3 -15.1 -16.1 -35.9
External Finance 31.2 13.3 11.6 27.1
Internal Finance -3.9 1.8 4.5 8.8
Totals
Investment 43.3 47.3 18.3 31.5
Saving -10.8 15.5 -5.7 -6.6
Balance = CAB -54.1 -31.8 -24.0 -38.1
memo: ‘aid’ 70 50 65 15
The organisation of external assistance was very similar in our two cases. The World Bank and the
IMF made a standard structural adjustment and stabilisation programme a condition for their
support. A common pattern of monetary and fiscal retrenchment was established as policy aims,
although as we have seen it proved difficult to implement in both cases - inflation reduction being
easier to achieve than fiscal solvency. The liberalisation of trade and finance were also conditions for
multilateral aid, as was privatisation; but progress was much more rapid in the case of Nicaragua
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At the micro-economic level, aid in both cases was largely administered by bilateral donors and
above all by non-governmental organisations. In Mozambique, a very high degree of policy
dependency accepted by government at the sectoral as well as the macro-economic level. Donor
coordination by sector and even province was relatively effective, due in part to a high degree of
consensus as to what to be done, even though there was often a lack of human resources to achieve
it.
In contrast, while there was a high degree of consensus between the Nicaraguan government and
donors on policy objectives in the first post-war administration (1990-94) this was not the case after
1995. There was a tendency for macroeconomic policy (agreed between the IMF and the central
bank) to be inconsistent with bilateral aid efforts coordinated with  sectoral agencies and NGOs.
What is more, there was increasing conflict after 1995 between the government and bilateral donors
on social objectives, with the latter becoming increasingly concerned by rising poverty and
corruption.
The Debt Problem
Both Mozambique and Nicaragua were heavily burdened by debt at the outset of their
reconstruction efforts. In both cases these contained a considerable proportion of debts to the
former socialist members of COMECON, but there was little prospect of these being repaid in hard
currencies and the transitional arrangements in the donor countries themselves led to a substantial
reduction of this debt. Commercial debt was of little consequence for Mozambique, and in the
Nicaraguan case had been re-negotiated during the war. In consequence, the peacetime debt was
fundamentally with DAC member governments and multilateral agencies. Further, the process of
negotiation for the restructuring and cancellation of debt was relatively successful with bilateral
donors during the 1990s in both cases, so that outstanding debt became increasingly
‘multilateralised’, so to speak. The issue of the implementation of the HIPC Initiative to Mozambique
and Nicaragua was still unresolved by the end of the period under consideration (mid 1999). In fact,
natural disasters so affected both our economies in 1999 and 2000 that the case for debt
cancellation came to based on inability to pay rather than the implementation of ‘sound’ economic
policies as had been intended by the donors.
Figure 1.17 below shows both the very high levels of indebtedness and a common pattern of relief
over time. However, it is noticeable that Nicaragua and Mozambique both started off the
reconstruction period with debt to GDP levels of over 300 percent, and both were still at this level
by the end of the 1990s - a level which is clearly unsustainable and was not in fact serviced, as we
shall see. In both cases, the ratio rose as new reconstruction loans were extended, and fell as the
wartime debt was restructured or cancelled.
Although the debt overhang was an enormous contingent burden on export income and tax revenue
in both cases - interest payments oscillated annually depending on the state of debt negotiations.
Overall, they averaged some 3 percent of GDP in both cases. When this average level is applied to
an average debt level of 300 percent of GDP; this can be seen as equivalent to 1 percent interest on
the total debt, or (say) 3 percent on one third of the debt. In other words, only a small proportion of
the debt was serviced in either case.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS45(1) Page 32 of Part I
Figure 1.17: External Debt in Mozambique and Nicaragua (percent of GDP)
None the less, contingent liabilities of such a size in proportion to the economy inevitably created a
high degree of uncertainty in the private sector and thus explain the problems with raising both
investment and savings levels.
Figure 1.18: External Interest Costs in Mozambique and Nicaragua (percent of GDP)
Given the low levels of exports in both Mozambique and Nicaragua (see above) even these minimal
debt servicing rates represented a very high burden on both economies, as Figure 1.19 below
indicates. In the case of Mozambique this oscillated between 20 and 40 percent of exports, with
some slight tendency to decline. In the case of Nicaragua, a similar pattern was observed during the
war period, but as soon as peace was attained in 1990, the debt service ratio to exports rose , and
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particularly that of Nicaragua, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that this debt burden made
reconstruction far more difficult.
The argument used by donors to maintain these high levels of debt and debt service in both cases
was that this was an effective form of policy conditionality. There is little evidence that this was the
case: on the one hand, after the end of the Cold War neither country was in a position to continue
with a socialist model in any case; on the other hand, such  conditionality as was required could
equally well have been achieved through grant aid. There is of course another (less explicit)
argument: that if apparently ‘deserving’ cases such as Nicaragua and Mozambique enjoy debt
cancellation, then it will be impossible to deny this facility to middle-income countries (eg Brazil) or
badly administered ones (such as Nigeria). It is far from clear why such a (‘moral hazard’) argument
would be effective in these latter countries’ debt negotiations; but even if this were to be the case, it
seems quite unjust that the people of Nicaragua and Mozambique - who have already suffered quite
enough - should service debt in order to ensure that larger debtors do not default.
Figure 1.19: Debt Service Burden in Mozambique and Nicaragua (percent of exports)
1.6 POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR UNDER RECONSTRUCTION
The Nature of the Peace Dividend
From the point of view of the private sector - on whom post-war economic reconstruction depends,
rather than government or donors - it is the reduction of uncertainty as much as the potential for
profit which determines the willingness to invest, raise production and create employment.
In Nicaragua peace came when the US ceased to support the insurgents and the Sandinistas not only
allowed democratic elections but abided by the result when they lost. The new government
accelerated the return to a market economy, but armed unrest and rural banditry continued for
several years led by the demobilised soldiers from both sides. Not only did demobilisation release
labour into urban unemployment rather than rural production, but it was difficult to recover lost
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In Mozambique peace came when both sides were exhausted and the settlement was guaranteed by
UN presence. In effect an implicit alliance of two warring parties was united in power, permitting a
considerable degree of political continuity. The return to civilian society and market reforms were
more gradual. Demobilisation was funded by donors and the return of the population to the land was
comparatively rapid.
In other words, the value of peace dividend depends on security situation (that is, the nature of the
peace settlement itself) as much as upon the reallocation of budgetary resources; in an agricultural
economy it is expressed by a return to land and the return of investor confidence. Both these changes
depend on the nature of the post-war political alliance between ‘victors’ and ‘vanquished’; and the
effectiveness of donor support depends upon the degree in which they are consistent with this new
‘social contract’.
Reducing uncertainty is not just a matter of the immediate settlement: it also requires clarity as to
political stability in the longer term. In Mozambique this longer-term perspective was clear: the
colonial power would not return and there was an implicit alliance of the factions (especially at the
local and provincial level) about a common economic development project based on market reforms
and nation building. In contrast, not only did a conflictive balance of power continued between the
Sandinistas and the traditional political parties, but these latter were sharply divided between
conservative and liberal groups. In consequence, the private sector - small farmers, domestic
businessmen and foreign firms - did not feel secure as to their long term future.
Figure 1.20: The Peace Dividend (1980 US $)
The economic dimension of the peace dividend in absolute terms is set out in Figure 1.20 below. The
rapid decline in military expenditure in Nicaragua is notable, reducing expenditure by some US $100
per capita a year. However, these resources were not immediately available for peacetime
reconstruction, for two reasons: first, they were largely supplied by foreign powers, and were cut off
once war ended; and second, the domestic resources required to feed and cloth the troops was still
needed in peacetime once they returned to the civilian workforce. In contrast, military expenditure in
Mozambique never exceeded US $ 20 per capita a year (indeed both sides appear to have largely
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Moreover, in both cases, health and education expenditure did not increase dramatically in
peacetime, so that the population did not perceive a significant social dividend. Indeed, while military
expenditure in Nicaragua was reduced to below the level of social expenditure by 1992, two years
after the settlement; this inversion was only achieved in Mozambique in 1995, some three years after
the end of the war. At first sight, this might seem to imply that economic and social recovery would
be more rapid in Nicaragua than in Mozambique. However, as we have seen, the reverse was in fact
the case.
Private Sector Response
The response of the private sector to the challenge of post-war reconstruction is detailed in Parts II
and III below. This is difficult to sum up in a way which permits the two cases to be compared. One
way of addressing the issue is to examine trends in private investment and saving. Estimates of the
trends in these variables are set out in Tables 1.4 and 1.5 below.
In the case of Mozambique (Table 1.4) the investment estimates for the private sector are probably
too high, but it should be remembered that they include the activities of NGOs. There is a clear
increase in the private investment rate after 1990, which sustained a steady rate of economic
recovery. What is more, the level of private saving moves from negative in 1988 to strongly positive
by 1996. Both of these trends can be said to reflect the return of private sector confidence;
supported by a reduction of public sector domestic financing (effectively seignorage). These positive
trends permit a steadily declining reliance on external finance for the private sector.
In marked contrast, the case of Nicaragua reflects a very different pattern of private sector
behaviour. On the one hand, private investment does not revive immediately after peace is
established- in fact it is only seven years later that the private investment rate rises to 20 percent of
GDP from the 10 percent it had been previously. On the other hand, the private savings rate remains
very weak, so that private investment is financed by public sector transfers into the financial system
(debt reduction) and external finance. Initially this external finance is associated with donor support,
but subsequently it is associated with an inflow of private foreign investment - much of it speculative
in nature. In sum, this does not appear that private accumulation recovered on a sustainable basis.
The recovery of small farmer production was central to post-war reconstruction in both
Mozambique and Nicaragua. The best comparable indicator in this context is domestic food
production per capita, which is illustrated in Figure 1.21. The downward trend in food output during
the conflict period is clear and explicable in terms of the focus of armed conflict in rural areas and the
dislocation of agricultural markets in both cases. None the less, it is noticeable that food production
stabilised in Mozambique during the war, and although it fell sharply in 1991-92 due to adverse
weather conditions, it did recover quite quickly thereafter - and had reached 90 percent of its 1980
level by 1996. This was largely due to the return of labour to the land, favourable weather conditions
and the re-establishment of some marketing channels.
In Nicaragua, in contrast, output also began to recover before the war concluded - due to
liberalisation of rural markets as in the case of Mozambique; but after 1990 production did not
continue to rise - remaining at little more than 70 percent of its 1980 level in 1996. This is not just a
question of food supply as such: it is also an indicator of the incomes of small farmers - and by
extension of the extent of rural poverty. The reason for the lack of recovery in this sector was partly
the continued unrest in the countryside; and partly the effect of closing the state-owned rural banking
system, which led to a collapse of rural credit, and thus the ability of small farmers to obtain essential
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Figure 1.21: Food Production Per Capita (Index, 1980 = 100)
The export response is an indicator of how the private business sector has recovered. Exports per
capita, as illustrated in Figure 1.22, give some indication of traded sector productivity and, insofar as
these are dominated by larger firms, of the activity of the business sector in production. Exports per
capita in Mozambique remained more or less static throughout the reconstruction period, and at
barely US $ 15 per capita per annum were clearly insufficient to finance the reconstruction process.
In sharp contrast, after an initial post-war decline, exports recovered relatively rapidly in Nicaragua
during the mid-1990s; reflecting the ability of larger farmers to obtain credit and re-start production.
In sum, the private sector recovery in Mozambique appears to have been led by small producers;
while in Nicaragua it was larger businesses that benefited. This difference has two important
implications. First, that post-war reconstruction based on small farmers can be more rapid as they
are able to respond rapidly to access to land and labour, and in any case do not have alternative
asset choices. Second, that a recovery programme based on small rather than large business is likely
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Figure 1.22: Export Productivity (US $ per capita)
The Role of Donors in Supporting the Private Sector
A central donor objective in both Mozambique and Nicaragua was the revival of the private sector:
in part due to the perceived need to lead societies away form socialist models of development; and in
part because the private sector accounts for the bulk of employment and output. None the less, the
main emphasis was on actions affecting the state sector, and relatively little attention was paid to the
private sector as such.
Table 1.4: Investment, Saving and External Finance in Mozambique (percent of GDP)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Public Sector
Investment 6.0 7.6 17.3 22.1 21.6 24.2 22.6 22.2 20.1 24.5 21.3 18.7 20.0
Savings -7.9 -9.7 -5.4 -4.7 -3.2 -5.3 -2.3 -4.6 -2.1 -5.2 1.3 2.0 1.4
Balance -13.9 -17.3 -22.7 -26.8 -24.8 -29.5 -24.9 -26.8 -22.2 -29.7 -20.0 -16.7 -18.6
   External Finance 7.3 8.0 18.0 22.9 24.4 29.4 25.5 25.8 20.8 30.6 21.7 18.5 21.1
   Domestic Finance 6.6 9.3 4.7 3.9 0.4 0.1 -0.6 1.0 1.4 -0.9 -1.7 -1.8 -2.5
Private Sector
Investment 30.3 29.7 21.0 17.1 18.7 17.1 19.7 21.1 24.2 20.8 24.9 28.6 ..
Savings 34.0 37.4 7.1 -7.1 -10.6 -5.6 -10.8 -9.7 -12.0 -10.1 7.8 13.4 ..
Balance 3.7 7.7 -13.9 -24.2 -29.3 -22.7 -30.5 -30.8 -36.2 -31.0 -17.2 -15.1 ..
   External Finance 2.9 1.6 18.5 28.1 29.7 22.7 29.8 31.8 37.6 30.1 15.5 13.3 ..
   Domestic Finance -6.6 -9.3 -4.7 -3.9 -0.4 -0.1 0.6 -1.0 -1.4 0.9 1.7 1.8 ..
Total ..
Investment 36.3 37.3 38.3 39.3 40.3 41.3 42.3 43.3 44.3 45.3 46.3 47.3 ..
Savings 26.1 27.7 1.7 -11.7 -13.8 -10.9 -13.1 -14.3 -14.1 -15.4 9.1 15.4 ..
Current Account -10.2 -9.6 -36.6 -51.0 -54.1 -52.2 -55.4 -57.6 -58.4 -60.7 -37.2 -31.8 -25.3
In the case of Mozambique, donors did help bring an end to the war and the re-establishment of
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outcome of repeated emergency programmes rather than a development strategy as such. In the case
of Nicaragua, the donors obtained the ‘transition from socialism’ they desired, and were able to
support a fairly coherent reconstruction strategy for the first five years (1990-94); but after that date
the incoherence of government policy itself left donors without a strategy, and reduced to sectoral
interventions. In consequence, even though the Nicaraguan government was the more overtly
supportive to private enterprise, the Mozambican strategy appears to have been more successful.
This contrast is underscored by the macroeconomic effects of the large aid inflow on the private
sector in the two cases. In Nicaragua the aid flow clearly led to overvaluation of the currency and
‘Dutch disease’ in the sense that profit margins on traded production (and particularly exports) were
reduced; while non-traded activities such as urban services and construction became highly
profitable. In Mozambique, this was not so much of a problem because aid was vital in lifting supply
constraints in roads, transport and storage.
Table 1.5: Investment, Saving and External Finance in Nicaragua (percent of GDP)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Public Sector
Investment 4.4 8.5 8 11.6 11.8 15.4 10 8.6
Savings -3.5 0.1 -0.6 -0.9 0.6 1.2 2.9 6.4
Balance -7.9 -8.4 -8.6 -12.5 -11.2 -14.2 -7.1 -2.2
   External Finance 12.4 15.2 9.8 14.8 11.9 17.8 9.4 11.0
   Domestic Finance -4.5 -6.8 -1.2 -2.3 -0.7 -3.6 -2.3 -8.8
Private Sector
Investment 13.9 11 10.9 10.4 12.1 11.7 21.7 22.9
Savings -2.2 -10.3 -2.8 -0.3 3.7 6.6 -4.2 -13.0
Balance 16.1 21.3 13.7 10.7 8.4 5.1 25.9 35.9
   External Finance 11.6 14.5 12.5 8.4 7.7 1.5 23.6 27.1
   Domestic Finance 4.5 6.8 1.2 2.3 0.7 3.6 2.3 8.8
Total
Investment 18.3 19.5 18.9 22 23.9 27.1 31.7 31.5
Savings -5.7 -10.2 -3.4 -1.2 4.3 7.8 -1.3 -6.6
Current Account 24.0 29.7 22.3 23.2 19.6 19.3 33.0 38.1
In sum, aid did help: it ensured post-war survival; and also supported liberalisation and
demilitarisation. But aid did not support longer-term fiscal solvency or export strength, or markedly
reduce poverty. Although aid was rather more effective in Mozambique than in Nicaragua, due to
greater coherence between government and donor aims; in neither case did it lead to a sustainable
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1.7 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Donors and Post-War Reconstruction
Multilateral lenders (that is, the Bretton Woods institutions and the regional development banks)
should suspend principle payments on their debt for countries in post-conflict reconstruction, so as to
avoid bilateral aid being diverted to maintaining multilateral debt service rather than alleviating the
economic burden of conflict on vulnerable groups.
In particular, the ‘highly indebted poor countries’ (HIPC) initiative should be related to post-conflict
reconstruction and the protection of vulnerable groups rather than long periods of macroeconomic
probity that war-torn economies cannot fulfil. This might be achieved by the suspension of debt
payments against commitments to maintain health and education without discrimination; or possibly
payment of debt service into accounts for aid agencies.
The use of official bilateral credits, longer-term development loans and multilateral investment funds
to place pressure on the governments in post-conflict economies should be applied with great care. If
the development finance being cancelled was properly designed in the first place - in other words
that it followed DAC criteria and is clearly targeted at poverty reduction - then aid sanctions affect
vulnerable groups disproportionately.
Conventional conditionality packages are not appropriate during reconstruction, veering between the
judgement that the usual adjustment package should be introduced and the view that adjustment
should be postponed until the war is ended. Where the price system functions poorly and post-war
disequilibria have devastating consequences on entitlements; administrative allocation of foreign
exchange, intervention in food markets, and rising tax pressure should be accepted by donors.
Structural adjustment assistance should focus on the strengthening export capacity before import
liberalisation; and the securing of long-term credit to investment before reforming the financial sector.
This should stabilise incomes and jobs for vulnerable groups in the short term, while reassuring the
population as a whole as to benefits of integration to the world economy in the longer term; both of
which should reduce the potential for conflict. Establishment of external solvency by cancelling all
outstanding official debt would support this integration, with the condition that the fiscal resources
released from debt service used only for the reduction of monetised deficits and net additions to the
provision of public health and education.
The design of humanitarian aid in response not only to conflict-related emergencies but also to post-
conflict reconstruction should take into account the explicit reorientation of development assistance
towards reducing inter-group and inter-regional inequality, and towards strengthening the capacity of
the state to deliver the public goods of health, education and security to all citizens.
Domestic Actors and Post-War Reconstruction
The governments of war-affected areas should consider the individual and regionally varying impact
of conflict on the economy and prioritise their actions accordingly. Policies suitable for equitable
post-war reconstruction include the return of trust, stability and peaceful politics; the equitable and
politically sustainable distribution of a peace dividend; the stabilisation of the macro-economy in
accordance with international donors as discussed above; and the establishment of humanitarian,
economic and institutional investment programmes which combine the need to build governmentQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS45(1) Page 40 of Part I
capacity, support the social needs of the population, and enhance the supply response to the
emergence of peace.
In particular, such investment programmes should address health, water, education, transport,
communication, agriculture and the civil and institutional sectors, depending on the legacy of the war
and the structure of the economy. Donors, the government and civil society (including representatives
from the opposing, war-time factions) should be involved in the design, planning and implementation
of these programmes. Despite the apparent humanitarian short-term needs of the immediate post-
war period, the distinction between short-term emergency planning followed by long-term
development work should be avoided. Instead, all programmes should lay early foundations for long-
term growth, eg by combining demobilisation or refugee return programmes with asset rebuilding,
transport improvement and private sector development programmes.
Above all, donors and domestic actors should strongly consider implementing a civil institutional
investment programme for the war-affected economy. Such programme should prioritise the
establishment of independent police and judicial authorities, improve the quality of the law making
process, strengthen conflict resolution capacities, support an independent press, and improve other
civil and market institutions which may have been damaged by war and which are pre-requisites for
balanced post-war growth.
International Actions to Prevent Recurrence of Conflict
There are two separate tasks here for the international community: on the one hand, to reduce the
economic vulnerability of poor; and on the other, to ensure that those countries remaining in the
vulnerable group do not slide back into conflict. The first task might seem to be merely that of
development policy in the conventionally accepted sense of market orientation, macroeconomic
stability, investment in human capital and so on. While these may well make up a sufficient strategy
for the middle-income countries, it is far from clear that this is the best course for the low-income
economies without sufficient assets or institutions to enter the international market directly.
Possible  international policy measures include schemes to stabilise the incomes of primary
commodity exporting poor countries so as to reduce uncertainty about foreign exchange income; and
preferential access to regional and multilateral trade arrangements to increase export capacity. The
international regulation of international trade and investment in ‘sensitive’ commodities (such as arms,
oil, gems, and timber) with a view to minimising the destabilising effects of these activities in
vulnerable countries could be achieved within existing multilateral trade agreements and the
multilateral investment arrangements currently under negotiation; by creating specific transitory
conditions for poor countries.
The explicit reorientation of co-ordinated international development assistance towards reducing
inter-group and inter-regional inequality, and towards strengthening the capacity of the state to
deliver the public goods of health, education and security to all citizens, would imply the adoption of
the reduction of conflict potential (and by extension, the reduction of vulnerability) as the key priority
in development co-operation with poor countries, rather than broader notions of economic growth
which can disguise redistribution of income and assets between social or regional groups which
increase conflict potential.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS45(1) Page 41 of Part I
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